The South Australian Residential Break and Enter Pilot Project was conducted by the Crime Prevention Unit, South Australian Attorney-General’s Department. Funding was provided jointly by the South Australian Crime Prevention Unit and the National Crime Prevention Program, Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department.
This Summary Volume was prepared by Ball Public Relations Pty Ltd and Christine Walter. The Crime Prevention Unit, South Australian Attorney-General’s Department, thanks Irene Shaw for proofreading this volume.
To order any National Crime Prevention program publication please contact:
Crime Prevention Branch
Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department
Robert Garran Offices
National Circuit
BARTON ACT 2600Ph: +61 2 6250 6711
Fax: +61 2 6273 0913
Crime prevention publications are also available at
www.crimeprevention.gov.au and www.cpu.sa.gov.au
Attorney-General’s Department: Canberra
© Commonwealth of Australia May 2002
ISBN 0 642 21037 3 (Summary Volume)
ISBN 0 642 21035 7 (Full Report)
ISBN 0 642 21038 1 (Appendices)
The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Commonwealth of Australia. Whilst all reasonable care has been taken in the preparation of this publication, no liability is assumed for any errors or omissions.
Design: Swell Design Group, Canberra
Print: Paragon Printers Australia
Publisher: Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department
Residential break and enter is among the crimes most frequently reported to police. It is a major concern for law enforcement agencies and policymakers throughout Australia.
The offence has many consequences beyond the economic impact on victims and police resources, and the unquantifiable emotional impact on the victim. There is, therefore, good reason to investigate ways of reducing the incidence of this crime.
Crime prevention work overseas, particularly studies by the Home Office in the United Kingdom, indicate that it may be possible to reduce the level of break and enter offences by preventing a repeat offence on the same victim. The South Australian Residential Break and Enter Pilot Project investigated that possibility in metropolitan Adelaide.
The Project was conducted in the two sites of Norwood and Tea Tree Gully. The exact areas were based on the corresponding police subdivisions in existence at the start of the Project.
The object of the Project was to provide an "intervention" to people whose homes had been broken into, within one week of the offence having occurred. Victims were contacted soon after the break and enter offence and asked to participate in the Project. Consenting victims were then provided with an intervention. Volunteers were trained to conduct the intervention, which comprised five strands:
informal victim support
security advice tailored for the actual dwelling and victim
direct linkage to engravers for property marking
neighbour contact and
referral to other agencies.
Participating victims in the Tea Tree Gully area received an added service with the provision and installation of locks provided by the Project, to the value of $200.
In the United Kingdom, there has been substantial research into the risk of a dwelling becoming the target of a repeat break and enter offence. There has been little such research in Australia.
Crime prevention strategies, particularly in the United Kingdom, have relied on this research, which shows that: when comparing the probability of a home that has already been broken into experiencing another offence, to the probability of a home that has not been broken into experiencing a first offence, the former is at greater risk. Furthermore, intervention strategies that concentrate on break and enter victims in a given area have reduced both the number of repeat break and enters and the total number of break and enters. These strategies are based on findings that break and enter risks rise for one-time victims when compared to the general population, and that repeat break and enters quickly follow. Intervention involves a rapid response to reduce the risk of a repeat break and enter.
There are two ways in which prior break and enter is a good indicator of future break and enter.
Event dependency: This is where the risk of future break and enter is raised by a prior break and enter and there is a direct causal link. For example: the offender has identified an easy entry point, other goods for theft and times at which the home is unoccupied, and so, returns to the dwelling to commit another offence; or, the offender has shared these details with others, who then visit the dwelling to commit another offence.
Risk heterogeneity: In this case, there are existing and stable risk factors that vary across households of interest. These risk factors explain why some households experience one or more break and enters while others experience none. In this case, a dwelling may be repeatedly targeted by different offenders and there will be no connection between the offences. The opportunity factors may be connected with either the individual dwelling or area vulnerability. Such factors, for example, may be the position of the house in relation to the overall layout of the street or other houses in the street; the vicinity of the house to other types of neighbourhood activities and facilities; the design of the house; and the layout of the neighbourhood in general.
If the factors contributing to existing risk could be adequately identified and measured, they would stand alone as predictors of break and enter. Prior break and enter experience would add nothing to their predictive power.
It is important to note that repeat break and enter may be influenced by both event dependency and risk heterogeneity.
There has been little Australian research on repeat break and enter. Of the research undertaken, each study has shown, with respect to their specific location, that:
in Beenleigh, Queensland (1997), 16 per cent of victims accounted for 32 per cent of break and enters, and the chances of a repeat offence was double the chance of becoming a first-time victim. It was also noted, based on evidence from Australian Crime Surveys, that the true rate was probably higher.
in another Beenleigh study (2000) important links were made between repeat break and enter patterns and the existence of stable and unstable ‘hot-spots’ for break and enter within the larger area of analysis.
in Perth, Western Australia (2001), repeat break and enter in the high-rate areas resulted from risk heterogeneity, while repeat break and enter in the low-rate areas resulted from event dependency.
The analysis of repeat victimisation is increasingly important. It helps determine the distribution of crime and the strategic allocation of crime prevention resources. If one-time victims are at greater risk of future victimisation, this will help direct and focus crime prevention efforts. A reliable repeat victimisation strategy can enable authorities to direct scarce resources to those who are at most risk and are, therefore, most likely to benefit.
The South Australian Residential Break and Enter Pilot Project was conducted by the Crime Prevention Unit of the South Australian Attorney-General’s Department as part of the National Anti-Crime Strategy/National Crime Prevention Residential Break and Enter Pilot Project.
Funding for the South Australian operation of the National project and its evaluation was provided jointly by the South Australian Crime Prevention Unit and National Crime Prevention. Sponsorship of the Project was provided by RAA Insurance.
To improve the quality of life in our community by exploring whether it is possible to reduce the incidence of break-ins of people’s homes, particularly by preventing that portion of residential break and enter offences that repeatedly victimise the same dwelling.
test a community-based response to reduce residential break and enter offences, including the use of community volunteers
produce materials that facilitate similar initiatives in other areas
develop a better understanding of the characteristics of the phenomenon of break and enter, including repeat victimisation in selected sites
identify specific intervention strategies that effectively reduce residential break and enter and prevent repeat victimisation for residential break and enter.
Between 16 November 1998 and 4 January 2000, a service was provided to victims of residential break and enter offences in the Norwood and Tea Tree Gully police subdivisions of metropolitan Adelaide (these subdivisions no longer exist due to a restructure of SAPol). The service was intended to prevent houses that experienced a break and enter offence in the Project period from being broken into again. It also sought to reduce the overall rates of residential break and enter in the two areas.
The service involved visits to victims by trained volunteers from the local community. Each visit was termed an "intervention". The intervention comprised the five strands of: a security audit, informal support, referral to other agencies, referral for property marking, and links to neighbours.
Interventions were conducted within approximately one week of the break and enter. A follow-up telephone interview was conducted with the victim six to eight weeks later. The telephone interview was to find out if the victim had acted on the original advice given by the volunteer and whether a second break and enter had occurred. (Research has identified that six to eight weeks after the offence is the period in which the residence is most vulnerable to a repeat offence).
Crime Prevention Unit, South Australian Attorney-General’s
Department
Provided joint funding and project management, which included a Project
Manager and Project Team based in the Unit.
South Australia Police (SAPol)
Involved in the development and monitoring of the Project through membership
of the Reference Group. Patrol officers, during the first half of the Project
until 30 June 1999, and then the Crime Reduction Section, gained the consent
of victims and referred them to the Project. Police stations in Project
areas acted as collection points for survey forms.
Victim Support Service
Member of the Reference Group; provided pamphlets for the resident’s
kit; involved in the development and provision of training; accepted referrals
from the Project.
Local Government (through the Community Services
Section which includes HomeAssist, Volunteer Coordinator, and the Local
Crime Prevention Program)
Member of the Reference Group; assisted in volunteer recruitment, venue
provision, and training; accepted referrals into the Council’s Home
Assist program; supported volunteers including debriefing and partnering
on some interventions.
Volunteer SA
Member of the Reference Group; advertised for volunteers; provided advice
regarding volunteer management and the volunteer job description/person
specification; member of sub-committee that developed the training framework;
assisted with the training.
Volunteers attended a preliminary information session that outlined the Project. Interviews were then conducted with volunteers, during which the following information was ascertained:
police and other reference checks
interest in the Project
motivational reasons for engaging in the Project
any obstacles that may prevent the volunteer from undertaking their role
time available to be involved in the Project
experience or related interest in other crime prevention projects.
A training program was the final requirement of the volunteer recruitment process. Four training programs were held. Participation in training provided an opportunity for the Project Team to observe more fully the suitability of a volunteer to deal with victims in the victim’s home. After successfully completing training and any associated follow-up meetings, volunteers were formally accepted into the Project.
good communication skills
calm, reassuring manner
good time management
reliability
friendly personality
an ability to communicate effectively with person of different nationalities
an ability to work independently
a clear understanding of the issue of confidentiality
work within the guidelines of the Project.
inability to work within the guidelines of the Project
lack of flexibility/availability
inability to work with residents who may display signs of trauma
difficulty in respecting the confidential nature of the Project.
group development processes
role clarification
information about the Project, crime statistics, crime prevention and the criminal justice system
technical information and practical training about home security equipment and advice, and research methodologies
interpersonal skills
volunteer’s rights and responsibilities
understanding the content of research surveys and other documentation.
To build on the training and to advise of developments, a series of follow-up training meetings were organised foreach of the four volunteer training groups.
Project staff accompanied all volunteers on their first "intervention". This provided support for the volunteer during their first experience and enabled immediate debriefing about concerns, performance and anything that had not been anticipated. It also was an opportunity for the Project Team to assess the adequacy of training.
Once the Project was operational, the Project Team held monthly meetings with volunteers. These were an opportunity for volunteers to socialise, share experiences and solve problems. It also was a forum for guest speakers and an avenue for the Project Team to attend to administrative needs and issues.
There was a need to ensure that volunteers provided an acceptable standard of service. It was also important to ensure that visits would not exacerbate any trauma, or affect a victim’s perception of vulnerability or their fear of crime.
Informal monitoring of the volunteers occurred throughout the Project. However, the formal quality monitoring process implemented in August 1999, enabled a consistent approach to assess the skills of all volunteers and to identify additional individual and group training needs.
Quality monitoring was a part of the Project design at the outset and was intended to begin with the start of the interventions. However, it was not initiated until two-thirds of the way through the Project. This delay occurred because more time than expected had to be allocated to volunteer recruitment, training and continuing support, and to monitor and tighten Project procedures.
There was considerable debate in the Project Team and the Reference Group over the standard of service that could be expected of unpaid volunteers as compared to paid professionals conducting the same service. The guiding principle for the Project was that, given the nature of the service being provided, victims should receive a level of service equal to that expected of a professional. Volunteers were monitored in accordance with that principle.
Each volunteer was provided with a kit to assist them during an intervention. It included:
photo identification badge
letter of introduction signed by the Director of the Crime Prevention Unit
street directory
torch
clipboard
mobile phone.
Volunteers were reimbursed for telephone calls and mileage expenses incurred on interventions. Reimbursement was in accordance with Local Government policy and practice.
The Project operated from 16 November 1998 until 4 January 2000. At the end of June 1999, the Project changed some operational procedures, with the most significant being the notification procedure. The period to 30 June 1999 is therefore referred to as the "first half" of the Project and the period after 30 June 1999 is the "second half".
The notification procedure signalled the start of the intervention. The Project used two different notification procedures: Notification Procedure 1 was used during the first half of the Project and Notification Procedure 2 during the second half.
Notification Procedure 1 was developed to minimise demands on police officers while giving the Project Team enough information to effectively allocate volunteers. Police attended the break and enter, and during the normal investigation (which included completing the Police Incident Report) they:
introduced and briefly described the Project
provided a pamphlet about the Project
encouraged victims to participate in the Project
gained consent from victims by way of a Victim Consent Form.
On returning to the police station, copies of the signed Victim Consent Form and the front page of the Police Incident Report were sent to the Project Team.
Notification Procedure 1 proved problematic, with patrol officers varying in their adherence to the procedure. This resulted in delays in verifying a victim’s consent to participate and, therefore, in assigning volunteers for the intervention. The Project Team identified several factors that may have contributed:
lack of adequate and regular communication between the Project and SAPol management and patrols
lack of understanding of the Project among police
demands on patrol officers’ time
police culture.
SAPol identified that a significant restructure of SAPol in the early months of the Project had a major impact on the success of the notification procedure. The restructure resulted in the re-assignment of personnel throughout SAPol and consequently, police began working in the project sites who were unfamiliar with the Project, its’ objectives and procedures. When it was clear that the notification procedure was not working, Notification Procedure 2 was implemented.
SAPol’s Crime Reduction Section:
extracted, each day of the working week, all offence details for the two police subdivisions
assessed the situation and premises for suitability to volunteer attendance, using details on the Police Incident Report
contacted all victims to gain their consent.
It quickly became evident that this process was difficult to manage within the resources of the Crime Reduction Section. From 1 September 1999, a Project Assistant was employed to work with the Crime Reduction Section to contact the victim to gain consent. Where a victim could not be contacted by telephone, a letter from the Project Manager informed the victim of the Project and invited him or her to participate.
Upon receiving the victim consent details, the Project Team contacted a selected volunteer to lead the intervention (referred to as a Lead Volunteer), and gave them the victim’s details.
The Lead Volunteer telephoned the victim to arrange a home visit and then advised the Project Team of the arrangements. A partner volunteer was appointed to assist in the intervention.
The intervention followed the five strands of:
informal victim support
security advice tailored for the dwelling and victim
referral to an engraver for property marking
neighbour contact
referral to other agencies.
Tea Tree Gully participants received an additional target hardening service with the provision and installation of locks provided by the Project, to the value of $200.
While volunteers were conducting an intervention, the Project Manager or a member of the Project Team was ‘on-call’ for the volunteers, in the event of an emergency or to respond to anything that needed clarification.
Volunteers completed several forms during the intervention, which aimed to:
collect data for the research aspect of the Project
provide victims with a record of the security recommendations
provide the Tea Tree Gully locksmith with details of the recommended locks.
Specifically, these forms were:
Security Audit — a record of security advice given. A copy was given to the victim.
Survey 1 — a record of the victim’s characteristics, and basic details of the offence and any past offences at the site and/or experienced by neighbours.
Survey 2 — a record of the characteristics of the residence and area.
Lock Sheet (Tea Tree Gully only) — volunteers completed a Lock Sheet for the handyperson. This sheet identified locks to be installed from the range available and in which rooms they were to be fitted.
Check Sheet — this was completed by the volunteer after the intervention to: check that all aspects of the intervention had been completed; record delivery of the neighbour kit to the neighbours (as opposed to the victim electing to deliver the kit); and, record if the lock installation service (Tea Tree Gully only) had been discussed and actioned.
Immediately after the intervention, the Lead Volunteer lodged the forms in a box at one of several police stations in the area. The Project Team cleared the boxes three times a week.
During the first half of the Project, follow-up visits (Survey 3) were conducted six to eight weeks following the offence, to determine if the victim had implemented any of the recommendations from the initial visit and whether they had experienced a second offence. During the second half of the Project, volunteers or a Project Team member would telephone a victim six to eight weeks after the intervention and conduct Survey 3 by telephone.
The initial objective was for a volunteer who conducted the intervention to conduct the associated Survey 3. This was largely achieved in the first half of the Project but the second half of the Project saw an increased demand for interventions, which limited the availability of volunteers. Consequently, in the second half of the Project, Survey 3 was unable to be conducted by a volunteer who had undertaken the original intervention.
The Outcome Evaluation analyses the impact of the intervention in the Project areas on the two categories of:
repeat victimisation for residential break and enter
overall residential break and enter rates.
The intervention covered two metropolitan police subdivisions (using boundaries in existence prior to the restructure of SAPol) and incorporated all or parts of four Local Government Areas.
The Local Government Areas where interventions were delivered were:
|
City of Tea Tree Gully Population |
92,000 |
|
City of Campbelltown Population |
44,000 |
|
City of Burnside Population |
39,000 |
|
City of Norwood, Payneham and St Peters Population |
32,000 |
The total intervention area population was 207,000, which is about 20 per cent of the population of greater metropolitan Adelaide.
Control and displacement areas were selected, and their break and enter rates compared with those in the intervention areas.
These were a set of suburbs defined approximately by the Local Government areas of Charles Sturt, Marion, Mitcham and West Torrens. They were selected as control areas because they were similar to the intervention area and not likely to be directly affected by any impact of the intervention.
It is possible that offenders may have been deterred or hindered from committing break and enters in the intervention area and encouraged to try elsewhere. The areas thought most likely to experience this ‘displacement’ were those adjacent to the intervention areas. The incidence of break and enter in the displacement areas (a set of suburbs that surrounded the intervention areas) was checked for an increase.
In addition, due to the large intervention area of 160 square kilometres and the relatively low population levels compared to international standards, there was a possibility that displacement might occur within the intervention area if the breadth and intensity of the intervention was not sufficient.
The most basic analysis of the Project concerns the intensity of intervention, in particular, what fraction of eligible victims participated in the Project? Table 1 presents the monthly pattern of break and enters and interventions. Table 2 shows the final outcome of the police referrals and is derived from the intervention database.
|
Year |
Month |
Break and enters a percentage of breaks and enters |
Referrals |
Referrals as a percentage of break and enters |
Interventions |
Interventions as a percentage of break and enters |
|
1998 |
11 |
214 |
35 |
16.4 |
26 |
12.1 |
|
12 |
205 |
96 |
46.8 |
80 |
39.0 |
|
|
1999 |
1 |
214 |
56 |
26.2 |
43 |
20.1 |
|
2 |
200 |
45 |
22.5 |
37 |
18.5 |
|
|
3 |
170 |
45 |
26.5 |
36 |
21.2 |
|
|
4 |
190 |
61 |
32.1 |
52 |
27.4 |
|
|
5 |
249 |
63 |
25.3 |
53 |
21.3 |
|
|
6 |
222 |
81 |
36.5 |
63 |
28.4 |
|
|
7 |
215 |
70 |
32.6 |
58 |
27.0 |
|
|
8 |
236 |
96 |
40.7 |
86 |
36.4 |
|
|
9 |
258 |
135 |
52.3 |
120 |
46.5 |
|
|
10 |
299 |
80 |
26.8 |
66 |
22.1 |
|
|
11 |
259 |
101 |
39.0 |
84 |
32.4 |
|
|
12 |
205 |
30 |
14.6 |
29 |
14.1 |
|
|
Total |
3137 |
994 |
31.7 |
833 |
26.6 |
|
|
Frequency |
Percent |
Interventions |
|
|
|
Details available from at least one survey |
|
|
|
project volunteers |
806 |
81.1 |
|
police intervention |
6 |
0.6 |
|
Police intervention - no details |
21 |
2.1 |
All Interventions subtotal |
833 |
83.8 |
|
Non-interventions |
|
|
|
Shed break only - out of scope |
5 |
0.5 |
|
No contact could be made |
24 |
2.4 |
|
Refused visit |
17 |
1.7 |
|
Cancelled visit |
90 |
9.1 |
|
Not Home at time of visit |
19 |
1.9 |
|
Other |
6 |
0.6 |
Non interventions subtotal |
161 |
16.2 |
|
Total |
994 |
100.0 |
Table 2 shows that a number of interventions were undertaken by police. The major reason for police intervention, as opposed to volunteer intervention, appeared to be the vulnerability of the victim.
The participation rate of just under one-in-three (994) of all (about 3000) break and enter victims in the Project area compares very favourably with similar overseas studies. A much smaller scale project in Cambridge, England, involved only 21 per cent of 171 break and enter victims and this dropped to 17 per cent for completed visits to the victim’s home. This comparison puts the South Australian Project into perspective and suggests that it was relatively successful in engaging break and enter victims.
While the data reported in the Project provide some indication as to the pattern of intervention among referred victims, there is little information available to explain why only one-third of potential victims participated. It is speculated that the low referral rate may be the result of police reluctance (during the first half of the Project) to ask victims to participate or a victim’s willingness "to get involved" even if the offer is put in the best possible light.
In total, the 994 referrals from police led to 833 interventions and 161 non-interventions. Of the 833 interventions, data was collected for 812 interventions but not all surveys were completed for each of these victims (surveys are described on page 7 of this report). No data was collected for 21 police interventions. The number of completed or partial surveys of each type is indicated in Table 3. The bulk of the missing data clearly derives from Survey 3 (the follow-up of victims eight weeks after the intervention).
|
Survey 1 |
Survey 2 |
Security Audit |
Survey 3 |
Any Survey |
|
804 |
798 |
795 |
632 |
812 |
The age and gender of victims who agreed to participate in the Project was analysed to measure any significant difference between those who received an intervention and those who did not. Data indicates that there were only moderately significant patterns of dropout by age and almost no differential by gender. Where age was known, the only significant difference in intervention status was in the 20-29 year age group where 26 per cent of referrals did not receive an intervention. This compares to 13 per cent in all other age groups (excepting those who were 80+ where the Project ensured that they received an intervention).
Analysis of those people who became involved in the Project against national census information, indicates that the profile of participating victims retains features more characteristic of the break and enter victim population than the general population. This means that the Project reached its target group.
Comparison of intervention and police databases indicates clearly that victims from suburbs with higher average household incomes were more likely to be referred to the Project. They were also more likely to participate in the Project once a referral had been made. This is so, even though suburbs with lower average household incomes experienced higher rates of break and enter.
All crime prevention programs are affected by the differential pattern of involvement of community groups. Furthermore, this pattern of engagement will not necessarily reflect the extent of victimisation experienced by these groups. Repeat victimisation programs at least start with a target group reflecting victimisation patterns. Reports of repeat break and enter interventions based heavily on police procedures, tend to provide little detail on the involvement of community members in these programs. This may be because police take control of the intervention process by, for example, offering different levels of service for victims depending on the frequency of their prior victimisation. It may be that a more directive approach by police ensures greater victim compliance with the intervention process. Nevertheless, the South Australian Project managed to retain a high proportion of victims once referred. It was principally in the referral stage that victims were lost to the intervention.
The Project encouraged a large number of victims to take preventative action against any future break and enter. The level of activity is impressive.
Action taken must be considered in the light of the reasons given by victims for not following all of the security advice given.
Action taken must be considered in the light of the reasons given by victims for not following all of the security advice given. About one-third of respondents to the follow-up survey (Survey 3) indicated they had not had sufficient time to implement all the advice. The implication was that more actions would follow outside the window of the Project intervention. The actions went as far as the installation or upgrading of new security alarms among 23 per cent of victims interviewed.
|
|
Norwood |
Tea Tree Gully |
Total |
|||
|
Action |
Number |
Per cent |
Number |
Per cent |
Number |
Per cent |
Security action |
||||||
|
112 |
30.5 |
121 |
45.7 |
233 |
36.9 |
|
130 |
35.4 |
133 |
50.2 |
263 |
41.6 |
|
58 |
15.8 |
63 |
23.8 |
121 |
19.1 |
|
11 |
3.0 |
13 |
4.9 |
24 |
3.8 |
|
137 |
37.3 |
116 |
43.8 |
253 |
40.0 |
|
345 |
94.3 |
251 |
94.7 |
597 |
94.5 |
|
227 |
61.7 |
163 |
61.5 |
390 |
61.7 |
Neighbour contact |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
310 |
84.5 |
222 |
83.8 |
532 |
84.2 |
|
174 |
47.4 |
137 |
51.7 |
311 |
49.2 |
Funding |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
4 |
1.1 |
135 |
50.9 |
139 |
22.0 |
The comparison between Norwood and Tea Tree Gully indicates that intervention in Tea Tree Gully was more successful in encouraging victim action. This would have been expected for the installation of locks, given the funding available in Tea Tree Gully. The difference is not solely attributable to the $200 grant for locks and installation, because Tea Tree Gully participants went further to invest more in security actions. However, on the whole, a fairly even percentage (almost 62 per cent) of victims from both areas took at least some action. Furthermore, a high percentage in both Project areas said they spoke to neighbours about the break and enter (84.2 per cent) and had increased contact with their neighbours (49.2 per cent).
Analysis of the Project data presents a prima facie case that the South Australian intervention prevented repeat break and enter of households experiencing a first break and enter. Repeat break and enter rose in the control area but remained stable in the intervention area.
There also is a prima facie case that the intervention did not reduce the total number of break and enters in the intervention area. The intervention area experienced a higher increase in break and enter in the 20 months following the intervention than did the control area.
A test of the intervention for its differential impact in Norwood and Tea Tree Gully reveals interesting results. The intervention involved a greater percentage of break and enter victims in Tea Tree Gully than Norwood. More Tea Tree Gully victims participated and they undertook a greater number of specific actions. These actions involved the installation of many target-hardening devices in both areas, including locks and alarms. These could be expected to have an impact on break and enter in the long term rather than simply the short-term. Further break and enter data need to be collected to monitor the longer-term trend.
The period of six months after the completion of the intervention showed promising downturns in break and enter in both intervention areas, but not in the control areas. If this pattern continues, the intervention can be rated as a long-term success.
The greater impact of the intervention in Tea Tree Gully was associated with greater Project success, as measured by the total number of break and enters as well as the rate of repeat break and enter. Tea Tree Gully experienced a lower rate of break and enter increase than both Norwood and the control area, when break and enters in the final six month follow-up period were compared with those in the 20 months before the Project.
It is possible that victims became more willing to report break and enters to police during the Project but a definitive statement on this is not possible. It is clear, nevertheless, that changes in break and enter rates could not have been attributable to increased reporting alone. It seems certain that there were increases in break and enter in Norwood that were above what could have been expected on the basis of the control area comparison. Further research on micro-level break and enter displacement using an enhanced police data file could evaluate this possibility.
The Program Evaluation identifies aspects of the service provided by the volunteers that are of value to victims and the community. It reviews how this could inform services in the Project areas and beyond. It also considers the capacity of police to participate in a collaborative approach.
The Project aimed for the intervention to occur within seven days of receiving the notification. It achieved an average time lapse of 7.74 calendar days between receiving a notification and a volunteer undertaking the intervention.
In addition, the Project aimed to conduct the follow-up survey (Survey 3) six to eight weeks after the notification. The average time lapse achieved during the second half of the Project was 8.41 weeks.
Overall, both of these rates indicate that the Project and the volunteers were able to provide a service to break and enter victims that was closely aligned with the Project's aimed time frames.
Almost 62 per cent of victims from both Project areas took at least some action in relation to security; 84.2 per cent said that they spoke to neighbours about the break and enter; and 49.2 per cent had increased contact with their neighbours. This suggests that the volunteers were successful in encouraging victims to make improvements to the security and safety of their property.
Few victims followed up referrals to other services. However, discussions with Victim Support Service about the appropriateness of the referrals they received, and with the volunteers about why they referred to a particular service, indicate that the referrals were appropriate.
A total of 47 volunteers were trained, with 46 volunteers ultimately conducting interventions and follow-up surveys (Survey 3). Thirty volunteers remained active in the Project at its conclusion, and 80 per cent of those volunteers continued in local crime prevention projects after the closure of the Project.
The expectation of the Project was that the volunteers were to function at a level that would be expected of a paid professional, given the nature of the job that they had to do and the group for which they were providing a service. Quality Monitoring involved a formal assessment of each volunteer whilst they were conducting an intervention, to ensure that they were offering a level of service to the expected standard.
The Quality Monitoring process identified that the level of knowledge and skills displayed by the volunteers when undertaking an intervention differed markedly. It also identified that a majority of the volunteers displayed a more than adequate ability in providing informal support, particularly listening skills and an ability to encourage victims to contact neighbours. This was supported by the feedback received from the victims in the follow-up survey (Survey 3).
Most volunteers were aware of areas in which they needing extra training. They welcomed the opportunity to improve their skills and competency. In particular, Quality Monitoring encouraged several volunteers to identify that they were not confident about conducting the security audit and making security recommendations.
Whilst the follow-up survey (Survey 3) sought no direct feedback about the use of volunteers, many victims gave unsolicited comments. No victims gave negative feedback or raised any issues about the volunteers, only expressing appreciation for the service offered by the volunteers and admiration for their willingness to give their time.
All stakeholders identified the security audit and, with the exception of one stakeholder, they also identified the informal support strand as the aspects of the intervention that the volunteers were best able to perform.
The stakeholders were unanimous in identifying that the volunteers should not do anything that oversteps the boundaries of their role in the Project, such as: attempting counselling; offering or suggesting that support was available beyond the parameters of the Project; continuing to support the victim by undertaking an advocacy role with other services; and talking about crime and risk factors with authority. The Project Team and stakeholders identified that they were aware of some instances where these boundaries were overstepped. Overall, the stakeholders identified that they heard only positive comments made about the volunteers and the use of volunteers to conduct the interventions.
The 46 volunteers who were active during the operational phase of the Project conducted 1,407 interventions (noting that volunteers attended in pairs). The average number of interventions conducted by each volunteer was 30.6 with the majority of the volunteers (32 or 69.6 per cent) conducting a number of interventions that can be classified into two groups: less than 10 interventions (12 volunteers or 26.1 per cent) or between 20 and 40 (20 volunteers or 43.5 per cent). The least number of interventions conducted by an individual volunteer was one and the highest was 106.
In addition, 41 of the 46 active volunteers assisted the Project Team to conduct the follow-up surveys (Survey 3). The average number of surveys conducted was 15.2 per volunteer, with the majority of those volunteers (23 or 56.1 per cent) conducting 10 or less. The highest number of surveys conducted by a single volunteer was 66.
The volunteers contributed a total of 1,563.25 hours (excluding travel time) to conducting the interventions and the follow-up survey. Based on 46 volunteers, the average time contributed by each volunteer to the operational phase of the Project was 34 hours, with the lowest number of hours contributed by a volunteer being 2.5 hours and the highest 117.5 hours. It is also estimated that each volunteer contributed an additional 62.5 hours in attending non-operational aspects of the Project such as training and meetings, making an average total of 96.5 hours that each of the 46 volunteers gave to the Project.
The total cost of training the volunteers, providing various items of equipment to enable the volunteers to conduct the interventions and the ongoing support meetings equated to:
$36.53 per intervention (follow-up survey not included)
$23.22 per hour of the time that the volunteer's gave to the operation of the Project (ie. conducting interventions and the follow-up survey, but excluding associated travel). This compares to the average hourly salary of a police constable at the time of the Project, which was $21.35 and included travel.
$8.18 per hour of the time that the volunteers gave to the Project in total (ie. operational and non-operational hours, excluding travel).
Following the closure of the Project, 24 (or 52.2 per cent of the 46 volunteers who contributed time to the operational phase of the Project, or 80 per cent of the 30 volunteers who were active in the Project at its conclusion) continued to use their skills in their Local Crime Prevention Committee Program's projects. Both the Tea Tree Gully crime prevention project officer and the Campbelltown, and Norwood Payneham & St Peters crime prevention consultant identified that they had to implement minimal additional training for the volunteers. This illustrates that volunteers can offer a long-term resource to the community with minimal ongoing support. Furthermore, unlike salaried professionals, after the initial cost to train and equip volunteers, the ongoing costs are minimal.
The Project Team identified that during the operational phase of the Project, difficulties sometimes arose around finding a Lead Volunteer. Some of these problems related to the Project Team's role in implementing a consistent internal system, particularly around communication within the Team. Other problems arose from the nature of voluntarism with individual volunteers not notifying the Team when they were unavailable, not returning calls promptly, and losing interest as the Project began to close.
In addition, the process undertaken by the Lead Volunteer to arrange a visit to the victim took too long, with sometimes several days passing before the volunteer contacted the victim. These operational issues impacted on the ability of the Project to achieve its two time lapse aims, namely: the time lapse between the notification and the intervention, and then the intervention and the follow-up survey (Survey 3).
During the Project the volunteers were surveyed to create a volunteer profile. When they were asked to identify why they had volunteered, the majority of the volunteers who responded to the question gave multiple reasons, which were:
|
contribute to community/help others |
23 |
|
project sounded interesting/worthwhile 9 |
9 |
|
personal development 5 |
5 |
|
expertise/skills to offer 5 |
5 |
|
personal experience of victimisation 4 |
4 |
|
social justice/criminal justice interest 2 |
2 |
|
NHW member - extension of that role 2 |
2 |
|
voluntarism in general 2 |
2 |
|
self-satisfaction/rewarding 1 |
1 |
The volunteers cited similar reasons for maintaining their involvement in the Project, adding that the encouraging response from the victims, the camaraderie of the volunteers and the professionalism of the Project also motivated them to continue.
The volunteers said that the police overall, with a few individual exceptions, displayed a good attitude to the Project. However, the view of the Project Team with respect to the level of police support for the Project was that there was great variance between the various levels of police who were involved in the Project, between individual police officers, and between the two sites.
Amongst the key stakeholders who were involved directly in the operation of the Project, including the police themselves, there were quite differing views of the level of commitment to the Project across the police hierarchy. Notably, the police were generally more critical of their level of support than anyone else interviewed. Some police did, however, maintain a high level of involvement, without which the Project may have been difficult to sustain.
Potential reasons for this differing support, given by various stakeholders, were:
a restructure of SAPol soon after the Project began. This resulted in significant changes of personnel and an understandable focus by police on a smooth transition to their new structure;
unsustained input at the patrol level by the Project Team and the high level of paperwork required for the notification process during the first half of the Project, which increased the workload of patrol staff;
a smoother notification process during the second half of the Project, which included provision by the Project of an extra resource to police (a Project Assistant); and
police culture.
Specific issues raised by key stakeholders about the feasibility of NHW or community groups undertaking the Project or aspects of it following closure of the Project were:
funding to enable training and management
confidentiality
response within a strict time frame
reliance on police
recruiting sufficient volunteers
protection of people's privacy.
The volunteers argued very strongly that for a community group to undertake any aspect of the Project they would need to be connected to an agency or body that is seen to have authority, such as the Attorney-General's Department.
The majority of the stakeholders said that Neighbourhood Watch or community groups were capable of undertaking any of the five strands of the intervention but two critical areas would need to be in place for that to happen, namely:
a manager or coordinator, with the majority identifying a professional or paid manager as being necessary
training (assuming that an adequate screening process was implemented when initially recruiting volunteers).
It is clear that adequately screened, trained and supported volunteers are well able to undertake each of the five strands of the intervention within the standard expected of the Project, and offer an effective service to victims of break and enter in their community. In particular, the volunteers demonstrated a strong ability to provide informal support (listening skills and encouraging contact with neighbours), which was greatly appreciated by victims.
Of the 30 volunteers who were active in the Project at its closure, 80 per cent moved into local crime prevention projects. This illustrates that not only can volunteers contribute substantial resources and effectively assist in addressing crime issues in their communities, particularly break and enter, they can also provide a long-term resource to the community that requires minimal ongoing support. Furthermore, unlike salaried professionals, after the initial cost to train and equip the volunteers, the on-going costs to support volunteers are minimal.
With respect to the police, the Project did not receive an across-the-board consistent level of collaboration. However, there are strong examples of sections and individuals who maintained high levels of involvement in the Project without which the Project may have been difficult to sustain.
The Project as a whole was successful in preventing repeat break and enter of households experiencing a first break and enter in the Project period. Repeat break and enters rose in the control area but remained stable in the intervention area. The intervention did not, however, reduce the total number of break and enters in the intervention area, which suffered a higher increase in this offence in the 20 months following the intervention than did the control area.
The Project involved a greater percentage of break and enter victims in Tea Tree Gully than in Norwood and, in addition, a greater number of specific actions were implemented by Project participants in Tea Tree Gully. These actions involved the installation of many target-hardening devices in both areas, including locks and alarms, which could be expected to have an impact on break and enter in the long-term rather than simply the short-term.
The six-month period after completion of the intervention showed promising downturns in break and enter in both intervention areas, but not in control areas. If this pattern continues, the intervention may well be rated a long-term success.